Add a third auto-loaded kind beside the host and the module: the guest, a
reusable definition under guests/ that a host enables like a module and that
realizes its interior as a systemd-nspawn nested container.
Split the shared base config so a guest can stand on it.
base.nix now holds the substrate both bases share — the primary user,
home-manager, and the unstable/stable overlays.
system.nix keeps the host-only machinery, and a new guest.nix is the slim
guest-base: it imports the full modules tree, pins the interior release, and
auto-enables the toolkit bundle and SSH so any guest is workable on sight.
Give modules.ssh a guest flavor.
A host restores its host keys from secrets as before, while a guest sets
hostKeys.restore = false, names no sops files, and self-generates a host key,
so it holds no age key of its own.
The lib grows a guest helper that declares the guests.<path> namespace with an
enable and a backend field.
Only the container backend is built; microvm is a reserved value that trips a
clear build-time assertion rather than silently building nothing.
A sample guest exercises the whole path, and neogaia enables it, so the guest
interior builds through the existing nix flake check seam.
The access policy was a separate fleet declaration mapping each machine to a
role and a client key, which the module looked up by hostname to derive what to
authorize. Authorizing a key needs the key text and nothing else, so the
per-machine names, the hostname lookup and the role existed only to reconstruct
a grouping that two lists already are.
The module now exposes those two lists and the set a machine admits, and a host
declares what it draws from in its own file. The fleet declaration is gone, and
with it a single-file directory at the repository root.
`authorizedKeys` defaults to the workstation keys. An option of a list type is
not mandatory the way a scalar one is: undeclared, it yields the empty list
rather than failing, and a machine admitting no key is unreachable. The default
makes the safe case the silent one.
Verified to produce the same system as the design it replaces, and against the
running machine in both directions.
The operator's SSH client key existed only as a file created by hand on one
laptop, so a reimage would destroy it and lock the operator out of the remote.
It now lives in neogaia's own secrets file, encrypted to the admin identity and
neogaia alone, and the client is pointed at the decrypted path rather than a
copy in the user's home.
Access becomes a policy over roles instead of a per-host list of keys. A new
fleet declaration names each machine's role and client public key, and every
machine derives what it authorizes from that: a workstation admits workstations
alone, a server admits both, so a compromised server reaches no machine of the
operator's own. Registering a machine is an entry in that one file.
Only neogaia exists, so the server half of the policy is built rather than
exercised. Two assertions reject a machine missing from the fleet and any entry
whose role no policy defines.
