Compare commits

...

4 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
e49fb929d8 feat(fish): rebuild the flake for the running host
`nixos-rebuild switch` alone leaves the flake implicit, which is not how
this system is built. Name it explicitly, taking the host from the
configuration that installs the shell so the two cannot disagree.

The reference stays relative, so `update` rebuilds the working tree the
shell is standing in rather than a fixed checkout.
2026-07-20 14:04:51 -04:00
78081143cf refactor: flatten the single-file lib and system directories
Each held one default.nix, so the directory added a level to descend without
grouping anything. They are now lib.nix and system.nix beside flake.nix, which
reads as the flake's own scaffolding.

The shared base config's reference to the shared secrets file was relative to
the directory it sat in, so it moves with the file.

Verified to build the same system toplevel as before the move.
2026-07-20 13:05:07 -04:00
6b5729b98a refactor(ssh): state the admitted keys directly instead of deriving them
The access policy was a separate fleet declaration mapping each machine to a
role and a client key, which the module looked up by hostname to derive what to
authorize. Authorizing a key needs the key text and nothing else, so the
per-machine names, the hostname lookup and the role existed only to reconstruct
a grouping that two lists already are.

The module now exposes those two lists and the set a machine admits, and a host
declares what it draws from in its own file. The fleet declaration is gone, and
with it a single-file directory at the repository root.

`authorizedKeys` defaults to the workstation keys. An option of a list type is
not mandatory the way a scalar one is: undeclared, it yields the empty list
rather than failing, and a machine admitting no key is unreachable. The default
makes the safe case the silent one.

Verified to produce the same system as the design it replaces, and against the
running machine in both directions.
2026-07-20 13:05:07 -04:00
f18b40091c feat(ssh): adopt the client key as a secret and derive access from roles (task 0019)
The operator's SSH client key existed only as a file created by hand on one
laptop, so a reimage would destroy it and lock the operator out of the remote.
It now lives in neogaia's own secrets file, encrypted to the admin identity and
neogaia alone, and the client is pointed at the decrypted path rather than a
copy in the user's home.

Access becomes a policy over roles instead of a per-host list of keys. A new
fleet declaration names each machine's role and client public key, and every
machine derives what it authorizes from that: a workstation admits workstations
alone, a server admits both, so a compromised server reaches no machine of the
operator's own. Registering a machine is an entry in that one file.

Only neogaia exists, so the server half of the policy is built rather than
exercised. Two assertions reject a machine missing from the fleet and any entry
whose role no policy defines.
2026-07-20 13:05:07 -04:00
9 changed files with 163 additions and 38 deletions

View File

@@ -38,14 +38,50 @@ Note that the fallback only becomes real once a second machine exists to connect
## Acceptance criteria
- [ ] `neogaia` has its own client SSH identity, distinct from its host keys, adopted from the key already on the machine
- [ ] Its private half is stored in `neogaia`'s own secrets file, encrypted to the admin identity and `neogaia` alone
- [ ] Its public half is committed in plaintext
- [ ] The private half decrypts at activation, readable only by the primary user and not by other accounts
- [ ] The SSH client uses the decrypted key with no hand-placed copy in the user's home directory
- [ ] Each machine declares a role, and the keys it authorizes follow from that role rather than from a per-host list
- [ ] Workstation keys are authorized on every machine
- [ ] Server keys are authorized on servers only, and on no workstation
- [ ] Registering a new machine is a role declaration in one place, requiring no edit to any other host
- [ ] `nix flake check` builds the `neogaia` toplevel
- [ ] Manual confirmation: the key materializes with the declared ownership and mode, an authenticated push to the remote still succeeds, and `neogaia` accepts an SSH connection offering the adopted key
- [x] `neogaia` has its own client SSH identity, distinct from its host keys, adopted from the key already on the machine
- [x] Its private half is stored in `neogaia`'s own secrets file, encrypted to the admin identity and `neogaia` alone
- [x] Its public half is committed in plaintext
- [x] The private half decrypts at activation, readable only by the primary user and not by other accounts
- [x] The SSH client uses the decrypted key with no hand-placed copy in the user's home directory
- [x] Each machine declares a role, and the keys it authorizes follow from that role rather than from a per-host list
- [x] Workstation keys are authorized on every machine
- [x] Server keys are authorized on servers only, and on no workstation
- [x] Registering a new machine is a role declaration in one place, requiring no edit to any other host
- [x] `nix flake check` builds the `neogaia` toplevel
- [x] Manual confirmation: the key materializes with the declared ownership and mode, an authenticated push to the remote still succeeds, and `neogaia` accepts an SSH connection offering the adopted key
## Implementation Notes
The whole policy is three options on the ssh module.
Two are the lists of client public keys, one for the machines the operator works from and one for the machines that serve.
The third is the set a machine admits, which a host declares in its own file by naming the lists it draws from.
Two earlier designs were discarded as more machinery than the problem has.
The first was a separate fleet declaration mapping each machine to a role and a key, which the module looked up by hostname.
The second kept the two lists but derived the admitted set from a role enum.
Authorizing a key needs the key text and nothing else, so the per-machine names, the hostname lookup and the role all existed to reconstruct a grouping that the two lists simply are.
A host now states what it admits rather than stating a category that something else maps to keys.
`authorizedKeys` defaults to the workstation keys.
An option of a list type is not required in the way a scalar one is: leaving it undeclared yields the empty list rather than an evaluation error, and a machine admitting no key is unreachable over SSH.
The default makes the safe case the silent one.
Only `neogaia` exists, so the server half has nothing to act on.
It was verified by temporarily adding a synthetic server key and declaring both lists on the host, then reverting.
A host drawing on the workstation keys alone excluded the server key, and one drawing on both admitted it.
Omitting the declaration entirely was confirmed to fall back to the workstation keys rather than to none.
Home-manager's `matchBlocks` is deprecated in favour of `settings`, so the client uses the latter.
`enableDefaultConfig = false` drops home-manager's own default directives, leaving the generated `~/.ssh/config` at two lines and every other directive at the value OpenSSH itself ships.
The committed public key carries the comment `alexion@neogaia` rather than the adopted key's own `contact@alexion.dev`, so the list says which machine each key belongs to.
An authorized-keys comment is free text and independent of the private key.
Manual confirmation was performed after a `nixos-rebuild switch`.
The secret materialized as `-r--------` owned by the primary user, and the public half derived from it matches the committed fleet entry.
The hand-placed `~/.ssh/id_ed25519` was moved aside for the test, so both directions were exercised against the decrypted secret alone: `ssh -v` to the remote reported `Server accepts key: /run/secrets/ssh-user-ed25519-key`, and an inbound connection to `neogaia` authenticated and returned a shell.
One follow-up is outstanding.
Deleting the now-redundant `~/.ssh/id_ed25519` and its public half was refused by the agent's permission layer, so both files remain on the machine.
They are superseded rather than needed: the same key is in `secrets/neogaia.yaml`, and the client is pointed at the decrypted path.
Removing them is a one-line manual step, and the key is recoverable from the secrets file if it is ever wanted back.

View File

@@ -85,6 +85,10 @@ The domain model (Host, Module, Skeleton, Auto-loader, Enable convention, overla
Warming it with `sudo -v` through the agent's own shell — including the `!` prefix — never works: that shell has no controlling terminal, and sudo reports `a terminal is required to read the password`.
It has to be a separate terminal.
A `PreToolUse` hook refuses privileged commands while the cache is cold, so a cold cache announces itself instead of stalling; a failure *without* that message is the sandbox, not the cache.
- An `mkOption` of a list or attribute-set type is **not** mandatory the way a scalar one is.
Those types carry an `emptyValue`, so an option declared with no `default` and never set evaluates to `[ ]` or `{ }` instead of failing with "option used but not defined".
A declaration that is genuinely required cannot be expressed by omitting the default — it needs an assertion, or a default chosen so that the silent case is the safe one.
This bites hardest where the empty value is itself dangerous, such as a list of authorized SSH keys, where it means a machine nobody can reach.
- `home-manager.users.<user>` cannot be assigned twice at the same level in one module: `home-manager.users.${user}.home.packages` alongside `home-manager.users.${user}.programs.x` fails with `error: dynamic attribute 'alexion' already defined`.
The interpolated key makes it a dynamic attribute, which nix will not merge the way it merges static paths.
Nest both under a single `home-manager.users.${user} = { ... }`.

View File

@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@
{ self, nixpkgs, ... }@inputs:
let
inherit (nixpkgs) lib;
my = import ./lib { inherit lib inputs self; };
my = import ./lib.nix { inherit lib inputs self; };
in
{
# Helper functions for discovering and building hosts.

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,9 @@
{ inputs, pkgs, ... }:
{
config,
inputs,
pkgs,
...
}:
# neogaia — Dell XPS 13 9380 laptop.
# Disk layout is in ./disk.nix; `fileSystems` are derived from it, none declared here.
{
@@ -31,6 +36,10 @@
# publishing them is their purpose.
modules.ssh.enable = true;
modules.ssh.hostKeys.sopsFile = ../../secrets/neogaia.yaml;
modules.ssh.userKey.sopsFile = ../../secrets/neogaia.yaml;
# A machine the operator works from, so it admits the workstation keys alone.
modules.ssh.authorizedKeys = config.modules.ssh.workstationKeys;
# fish as the login shell.
modules.fish.enable = true;

View File

@@ -46,17 +46,15 @@ let
inherit inputs;
my = self.lib;
};
modules =
(collectNixFiles (self + "/modules"))
++ [
inputs.home-manager.nixosModules.home-manager
inputs.chaotic.nixosModules.default
inputs.disko.nixosModules.disko
inputs.sops-nix.nixosModules.sops
(self + "/system")
(self + "/hosts/${hostName}")
{ networking.hostName = hostName; }
];
modules = (collectNixFiles (self + "/modules")) ++ [
inputs.home-manager.nixosModules.home-manager
inputs.chaotic.nixosModules.default
inputs.disko.nixosModules.disko
inputs.sops-nix.nixosModules.sops
(self + "/system.nix")
(self + "/hosts/${hostName}")
{ networking.hostName = hostName; }
];
};
# Discover every host (a subdirectory of `hostsDir`) and build each one.

View File

@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ in
jctl = "journalctl -p 3 -xb";
# Rebuild the system, and reclaim disk from old generations.
update = "sudo nixos-rebuild switch";
update = "sudo nixos-rebuild switch --flake .#${config.networking.hostName}";
cleanup = "sudo nix-collect-garbage -d";
};

View File

@@ -3,16 +3,56 @@
lib,
...
}:
# The OpenSSH daemon, serving host keys restored from secrets.
# SSH on this machine, in both directions.
let
cfg = config.modules.ssh;
user = config.user.name;
hostKeySecret = type: "ssh-host-${type}-key";
userKeySecret = "ssh-user-ed25519-key";
secretName = type: "ssh-host-${type}-key";
in
{
options.modules.ssh = {
enable = lib.mkEnableOption "the OpenSSH daemon, with host keys restored from secrets";
workstationKeys = lib.mkOption {
type = lib.types.listOf lib.types.str;
default = [
"ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIGxQ4kWsBo2OGYIPOkFe0vNEcB3yoJwAu0y9wrdQzALE alexion@neogaia"
];
description = ''
Client public keys of the machines the operator works from.
Every machine admits these, so any of them reaches the whole fleet.
'';
};
serverKeys = lib.mkOption {
type = lib.types.listOf lib.types.str;
default = [ ];
description = ''
Client public keys of the machines that serve.
Only other servers admit these, so one that is compromised reaches no
machine the operator works from.
'';
};
authorizedKeys = lib.mkOption {
type = lib.types.listOf lib.types.str;
default = cfg.workstationKeys;
defaultText = lib.literalExpression "config.modules.ssh.workstationKeys";
description = ''
Client public keys this machine admits for the primary user, drawn from
the lists above.
A machine the operator works from takes the workstation keys. One that
serves takes both, so servers reach each other. The default admits the
workstation keys, since a machine admitting none is unreachable.
'';
};
hostKeys.sopsFile = lib.mkOption {
type = lib.types.path;
description = ''
@@ -39,23 +79,60 @@ in
already pinned makes the host unrecognisable to it.
'';
};
userKey.sopsFile = lib.mkOption {
type = lib.types.path;
description = ''
Encrypted file holding this machine's SSH client private key, under the
entry `ssh-user-ed25519-key`.
This is the key the primary user offers to authenticate to a remote
server, not a key the daemon presents to identify this machine.
It belongs to this machine alone, so withdrawing its access does not
re-key any other.
'';
};
};
config = lib.mkIf cfg.enable {
services.openssh.enable = true;
# The daemon reads its host keys once at startup, so a re-key has to restart
# it to take effect.
sops.secrets = lib.genAttrs (map secretName cfg.hostKeys.types) (_: {
inherit (cfg.hostKeys) sopsFile;
mode = "0400";
restartUnits = [ "sshd.service" ];
});
sops.secrets =
# The daemon reads its host keys once at startup, so a re-key has to
# restart it to take effect.
lib.genAttrs (map hostKeySecret cfg.hostKeys.types) (_: {
inherit (cfg.hostKeys) sopsFile;
mode = "0400";
restartUnits = [ "sshd.service" ];
})
// {
# The primary user is the only account that authenticates with this key,
# and the mode admits no other.
# The client rereads it per connection, so no unit restarts on a re-key.
${userKeySecret} = {
inherit (cfg.userKey) sopsFile;
mode = "0400";
owner = user;
};
};
# An empty list is what stops the daemon generating keys of its own.
services.openssh.hostKeys = [ ];
services.openssh.extraConfig = lib.concatMapStrings (
type: "HostKey ${config.sops.secrets.${secretName type}.path}\n"
type: "HostKey ${config.sops.secrets.${hostKeySecret type}.path}\n"
) cfg.hostKeys.types;
# The primary user is the only account reachable over SSH.
users.users.${user}.openssh.authorizedKeys.keys = cfg.authorizedKeys;
# The client reads the decrypted key where it is written, so no copy of it
# lives in the user's home to drift from the secret.
# Declaring no defaults of home-manager's own leaves every other directive
# at the one OpenSSH itself ships.
home-manager.users.${user}.programs.ssh = {
enable = true;
enableDefaultConfig = false;
settings."*".IdentityFile = config.sops.secrets.${userKeySecret}.path;
};
};
}

View File

@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
ssh-host-ed25519-key: ENC[AES256_GCM,data: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,iv:q6chCkDdccg6pyH7fr8yMvNDcGjl5ZhO4CN25M7ydkk=,tag:JSuTMuG+0fSEjvG8uLG56A==,type:str]
ssh-host-rsa-key: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:JT1wN4CH5ndo8k7Jl1W7cPXdXNSnECjMs7DB4bJ1xTJueYIxrUF3uq888//Bvj2yoHf0Ddg/J4rq9z0HDJJPoyz/fAc/gpWOdVxV04L8j6iE4Vope30/NXM9Jf+CZLGHxs5RTeIM5ps03n98mnecZeB+1/tcecHRHtUV10rX13bYpDGMHPYsOwoUUtHxzb20HPbU8OrGqpjZp0S/xX2/cYU3GzdnZHO1jGdvRJNKj8bWrlw2qwZjMifUQ0YWj9H3UH4lHluthQN1WjBhJUAB8IPrx/SDKVgIMuXK7QvHg5kPRVt/iBjj448tX1hKaRdQaWKCSg22oN2KYVCGSVGceuPe8sfS+1qPe6JyxYnHJUBrP4OuYCC8Fe8X5FBEbPvYPUjfwnE4kG4PYmMyn1NpEYpMhO4rH+kT483mKwoI+/N3r7tS08Orelr6f1eSjkFBs4B2OoZNO6zPy4UupKu6yUQ1Z3ep/V+EXfBtI291qWvACmaBa/dSFDXscNcHXwGFfp+Zk9EvsMCh3kEUBVvz0oBGc41aUksqqGX/hH9N2v6T8FsHqDrNhQKccCyM/CUZwhM/qqRDt5saN/ttDd1oMxBtfrf9ow81FdLQLjD/Ei7BeP7zTy1GCPrpDnWDdHr8jBmHu9MG212tdFbYD+/8WNYsBXyMdbwjrPLIpKkNSyQ0SaXVhBvrzp+Y3vnCAOGipow76VREVs5zJKQXMzR6c9hxFR42HkmSae9qs5E7pDggYMUv/83V5accusvG1KmJWE8mC1zguRZzjeoXnpUrB5XaR6xhXJTWdFZA1StSCguBJUS6dqt8gXxyQCWvrSVNZSF1BAuYpaKs8FpocasZvWtlZvgiP2ECfLk0fYKX2jjqfxPzi3EOgneqmMUK9xYfwO5+B8llrF5RqIPFVCEvtr8ItgeIlt6Zzjc3nZxpBlqGtyifym+rQi1J7hT+Alr5GyYHNaU1nGm15knfxUhzKh+ZctdipxIQknmhb8fZ27vSm/2h5AwCu2vmChlbvm5GCC/Rnwtbvs5ShrDTTYym3jFs+KWq1pf7I1S6Ayec5Lt1ts3fp+QmLQsthe5Cj76GD1uIO5Z3026UH0T1FMqy/lfiw9+E+iCBGtlgO5Q4djwlqk60+VnMYPB3+qCryagPwsd5R4i45yayKRRkK7uEi+QvIPexjmUdnvlUyz6JnSZKbC2jsauD0UL30n689LFoDx5HUANYm4Xwi9oelaE8m3rtm8eEfvpgeHyAcPwZMERJO6TcMmr/u90lCU5h9c45UK2vhd5Db5WUaLonhSuoUiqul6fjk7NpAYLnD/fnzu/ADgFHrw2d89SBIX0PLHz9pWcb/ByWBC6piy2tQQI/k37K6nORUexwlUYqE+GvICSYD65L6m0WBSq4byM37u5hc7U7sk5VS/cL58bb5MHNdX0YAumgnjGox3VHCPb038C9O4p4dfoWyyJGttXExujvhokg96OG5smblHgDo6W3Cq9MTjpkFdk2OQophyng3I69SoEa2HgfjdpY89bPiwma9v3k5jnej8C1HMt/I94aOA6TJgfAY9FDtGMWJqMs+/F6Fnl8vs7QRsjKvZFJc3D50vZQbm/7JVgTOJf0stt5btarWlip0uXCdPRf9OEy78n9jZBTLPnS7SbcqE1k2hOek6+T5A7GyuzjlX8/AASiVGcB0tB5bI/LBSBaQ+sz34lfmONA8JvJ/Sid0poiAUfum1hRi9JEB+3G3xRhWFafwaT4eJ6r0beBWR7EmX7Kd7OhKbpZ/DfKDc+FWZLqtx+yOa4DQV30c7yr245aCxbnSk9QXi+HjVHBMbcAJGRoSeFmGue/RgdHsODDntmnEJbnaWBL2+lumfxhNyKcJ3CPEwsWf76+JfgLRNRJHti3bIQZQwfqp5TpfON8hbY7jmF0YlL/bBvbl4n3ud2jd12+0cV+LccT8OoO97MLbhnnnD10v3PlyXqAibZJbe3nkTQJL2F93ouiMF+7pSd8+rHAoyAUh+91YQvxGs8SotlF1GIkg6Xzdl3ZfMfCckSqlQeQXkxy41bsze8QFLTzDwlfCYi+AH7YCxisqpiNHC+KKK9o00i3K8ShS7rbO+udpPhaWbpM5L1xiQ0aNuYtKx7ghvr/egRzI+QRNTgfJ560ARaH3N7k808oIgrzqVQlyv2szHoCgoqbE3pPo5nTJQ3d8NZH1aZWcHt+IdGxQnkYg/pfVxabDgWYO3PQOtlPmQ6Qg+4C+9Ff1QKQ11HrrbMgg5amcdUGQZyhrZ4GLPXuDhk2i9GtpuMHgyRKmw8rF8dnGDukA95lZdL5sFdG2n85IOLO6lmwmHzk15LQjIRmLoBU5hmCJC5aeutoTzwT3nB/vmFaOZeZ/YS5a23IBm0rIS2f48NJHpcPFIUjfS6YQIUriftXNRvLVNs1RBNkWWr/CzCXch7/pfU2biTPvwlvhFV/qm5bzoVKjrtamKrB59WH8JeIHe/Iu56jKrjxtatHS4MEBN/qDR4aHBR7Jxi95D3yczVvf1bVuGHbMfhNe+OhjmD53igAksmtGFUg88KOwz9m3KM5R9kwKFXr4PH0FITW/gX49n/Gu4uqFgmcwImtm2yFaMwI+ubi/wPWkzYlM2W88mR7gwlmdjWYcJTZ7msiRbU69v5IPLqBtm8p7sHR/5i8/UZjo0xrr4kVgVmA1YdcKwzixXhRMgweLeN9Su7I8F6CPOQy9f90V8kenY4pdD9XpSbVZEI6eV4vmMIp0tKpPgHEYw6nQioFhm3h+N4cCzJ6cNPbGfjMpqMQXIUymbsO3NHtJBC63j+Yat47LZwMpQ1VNUt74h585wmKx8OBeiCm4Lz3z4B1KsVC3lxevvufkl9S9yDvVa5XWOSsLH1x1Lfqq0s+diSkjIViC6l9CIvQr/uliwG/L5Nk0/OQ8yZWmzGDDugI9VJZ/U0xApGxJHub5es8T6Lq7DG5ZPTSVKFG30gobeYZJddwpn53JqUUM4cjOMqUV7b2OMnGTRTpTN8VKRVGCFbuN6wAhknxFtZF8d1/yqS2+t5btuyUldSH3Wswp0POuEz6fQb+pCvYF9KrFNyETlZ/f8DKNADp8bti3XTWzIQlRwJsMBuqNg76SmSIXX4srJI/umb2d9rB+AtNjEeP5mxR2IRlHLAnmo5QZwEcRVGMrTB1WE6hrHsu8jo+1HnD6fCzPu7W6G51OD/QgSh4XL3uGCJl6oirSXfUQZnXy5fGp8TOyv1l7tus8ifp/XeT6CRrOn4s7yJL4IeNuj6wZo71xrC0SgPlRa+JIBGOrlKwTpNbMT3StLY1WusHvhseymrhqDLubGyj/ooKgRLUrA+jevFU/N+YhKUKUYuijgTuDwMUh2VonKBQtT9CnTkgbKm3k4e1PPl9x6hRPqz+vMV87sDJp9Oepvp75azsHBUV1A6WhA7E+3GvA0T/TWDR3qfdbvbMyt/qYD3r25S27uTP8chT1m8Xr9WIP7gDizzKcua9TUNB08Hgp9sRPylQH/4PWown9HAggDcibFUPeUkuKWix1uqY1jKv/jj//4PKLZaoaJXv4LhPnsjzmO3Xib63IQTH3ppHroHdfkfvN9atu3rYFbvyYS9JILbbEGLeb4DQTNL9Udy/Ord/pDDSGa2QddCOkTnM3IS+ZaXOtxMCJW5cYNUD+ZIu24DtCPZoZLFLtqpTt7mjeyzo3HhPQ6stU9J4yjKu26QbC8LowNATN0mb4Bx9hL/kOwNmVT24FNo6y3eVYZNmdP0wnxx279m1mEJ1wNYHGfKVQutEK4TIhZ0Z8kClQbvy10LsbJemF0PqGMGRAv4T06uR1vOgp2386IjkxY6NwS2OWEegzmsoYl+lw5cymiDbuDUmMnu2jQeA2g0Ug+l01vmQNb0MWm4vLcCzXkzM1JTpmIGulGMcdns/VpiPLZfT67o0ul9+MX77ZzfMmj6lKD4JUGiIBHSvnnCaEgUoLxAV8I/li+1Xg3KIVHmlw3wSk0epTxc+9EQT0g1/BsQpp3bYFNVY512W4HbYPbRz+X/BY4xz5ydiHPkS2adY6frMWsZDkRfLJ6xw2xhkq4qTv8GPrhzPLrW1DD0OGIucA/pLBqVOBrAQot1itSZbKNF3vKbE9ruEt/4JKPtouY0A3hmSI992poFeemlJ57obovNmgjHAqzIroAdvu9FKDCSbPIxQ5QBis2S96z3WWbmq6sDg37DmoL66TlIBEhFRdopm6vudu2irz457Ue7mCMeY9iO2yuzRtUs+r1XpZ/qZKvf72QN1PhRMWRF1cH/uZ2dbHoIKOm0mztSLdpIl3xR+mRGi4MMlh0H8iug+pm4j7f286wxlRQnmyG6E9eXgkx5sWbXLU+2tzCm2VMWr4XFBVVIOi6u7VnK7oNNvSdDpSpmTqs7xvVRH1+5gQuDkPKuEIPBVGXm07cc2bDV5wWxXDJBB5Fe7fMGBWyMhmlzolbvvsksNjlQ1v5QVIKjz/3guLNERQFBsAyzVnQYD0QnV,iv:xbUR7YIZKQd6qlzsEZT4aur5xZuRBgQvmSSTdpc05ag=,tag:UIuoHsgMYWmhdJR/GDB0iA==,type:str]
ssh-user-ed25519-key: ENC[AES256_GCM,data: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,iv:f8YPwuXpP94FMhCIgkLpR1PVufl3PPQVnNaEn56WXPE=,tag:8YnJjtOCEleEZdKQu0bBfA==,type:str]
sops:
age:
- enc: |
@@ -20,7 +21,7 @@ sops:
cbQ5nwrYjI7FapucJQQFebB7FrLKCDgZRyw+/nhCmEJSWFz7iZKLQA==
-----END AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----
recipient: age14a04vphzjq74epfrz9a09wjw8lzchtru84awzuq2n45d8f42ychqjs89qe
lastmodified: "2026-07-20T03:45:30Z"
mac: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:ThhDV+a054Z32fFkgkJ40I/Wr9EY9gMa/Wc8uToMaqGGdMT87xJH1QEJxdKHuzgWAXFLH9+4Rl/t2uRFC6AVyOGyBou/NDy0G3WzIfrJn1raTYwIvNm4I/0vycRvLyOi4ERPpDERqgoDczeE9i7U7Qves/KdLFPqOlGHDBI/QWE=,iv:oBNu3jeM7S41+mhKYzpYUzyynrJ8hQ7uA8Msd0UrIcA=,tag:HWV32TmxfKZlLcDWo4iTiA==,type:str]
lastmodified: "2026-07-20T16:29:45Z"
mac: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:XLrro73Z4hA4ntA2uFlBj+eNJJXlYw3YUFFLI/it9KvvEbxlvAVka++HQpby2rRZm+VjSXa7BDtzSnLA4Jpue2csUQUMVpKCGvWBNxTBnZpkKpi7fJd2AOFcMA+mXk19OS9YdnfZy9VLpr4+XiM8e+zxNEijZmHXn0gsGUotd8I=,iv:6FWSG86Ix764vD/BMlnEWDdQX74yIg0wkmz5Zz343VQ=,tag:tIeODybScPRVuLBpj7gzVw==,type:str]
unencrypted_suffix: _unencrypted
version: 3.13.2

View File

@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ in
# satisfy the secret below.
# Clearing both `sshKeyPaths` defaults keeps the SSH host keys out of the
# decryption path.
sops.defaultSopsFile = ../secrets/shared.yaml;
sops.defaultSopsFile = ./secrets/shared.yaml;
sops.age.keyFile = "/var/lib/sops-nix/key.txt";
sops.age.sshKeyPaths = [ ];
sops.gnupg.sshKeyPaths = [ ];