alexion
5e254857b9
Supersede ADR 0001's SSH-derived key mechanism with an admin identity held outside the repo plus a per-host identity on each encrypted root. Decoupling the two is what lets the SSH host keys become secrets themselves rather than the root of trust they were. Add the spec, the three implementing tasks, and the glossary terms the breakdown speaks in.
15 lines
922 B
Markdown
15 lines
922 B
Markdown
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status: superseded by ADR-0002
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---
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# Use sops-nix for secrets
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The repo is public, so no secret — including password hashes and the WireGuard/ProtonVPN key — may be committed in plaintext. We manage all secrets with **sops-nix**: encrypted into the repo and decrypted per-host at activation via an age key derived from each machine's SSH host key.
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We chose sops-nix over agenix for its multi-recipient encryption (one secret readable by both a host and the admin laptop) and its grouped-file editing workflow, which scale better across the planned five hosts with a mix of shared and per-host secrets. The cost is slightly more upfront machinery than agenix's one-file-per-secret model.
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## Consequences
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- User/root passwords use `hashedPasswordFile` backed by a sops secret, never a committed hash.
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- Each new host must have its SSH host public key registered as a recipient before it can decrypt its secrets.
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