alexion
d5b67947f9
Capture the design work for the NixOS migration before any implementation: - .claude/CONTEXT.md: domain glossary (Host, Module, Skeleton, Auto-loader, Enable convention, unstable/stable overlay) - .claude/adr/0001-sops-nix-for-secrets.md: secrets tooling decision - .claude/spec/laptop-mvi.md: frozen minimum-viable-install spec for neogaia - reference/: read-only snapshot of the current CachyOS configs (secrets and state excluded), plus ENVIRONMENT.md profiling the live environment to guide replication
11 lines
882 B
Markdown
11 lines
882 B
Markdown
# Use sops-nix for secrets
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The repo is public, so no secret — including password hashes and the WireGuard/ProtonVPN key — may be committed in plaintext. We manage all secrets with **sops-nix**: encrypted into the repo and decrypted per-host at activation via an age key derived from each machine's SSH host key.
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We chose sops-nix over agenix for its multi-recipient encryption (one secret readable by both a host and the admin laptop) and its grouped-file editing workflow, which scale better across the planned five hosts with a mix of shared and per-host secrets. The cost is slightly more upfront machinery than agenix's one-file-per-secret model.
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## Consequences
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- User/root passwords use `hashedPasswordFile` backed by a sops secret, never a committed hash.
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- Each new host must have its SSH host public key registered as a recipient before it can decrypt its secrets.
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